

The Air Campaign Planning For Combat

Whispering the Secrets of Language: An Emotional Journey through **The Air Campaign Planning For Combat**

In a digitally-driven world wherever displays reign great and instant interaction drowns out the subtleties of language, the profound techniques and emotional nuances concealed within phrases usually get unheard. However, set within the pages of **The Air Campaign Planning For Combat** a fascinating literary value pulsing with organic thoughts, lies an extraordinary journey waiting to be undertaken. Written by an experienced wordsmith, this marvelous opus attracts viewers on an introspective trip, softly unraveling the veiled truths and profound impact resonating within ab muscles material of every word. Within the psychological depths of the moving review, we shall embark upon a sincere exploration of the book is key styles, dissect their charming publishing style, and fail to the powerful resonance it evokes deep within the recesses of readers hearts.

Carl A. Spaatz and the Air War in Europe Richard G. Davis 1993 This is the first detailed examination of the career of the highest-ranking U.S. Army Air Forces officer in Europe during World War II.

The Air Campaign: Planning For Combat John A. Warden III 2014-08-15 In the short history of air warfare, no nation with superior air forces has ever lost a war to the force of enemy arms. Air superiority by itself, however, no longer guarantees victory. This book, one of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimension of war, explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. In *The Air Campaign*, Colonel John A. Warden III focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. The most compelling task for the theater commander, he argues, is translating national war objectives into tactical plans at operational levels. He presents his case by drawing on fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. Colonel Warden shows us how to use air power more effectively-through rough mass, concentration, and economy of forces-because, he warns, the United States no longer holds an edge in manpower, production capacity, and technology. Simply put, an air force inferior in numbers must fight better and smarter

to win. This book offers planners greater understanding of how to use air power for future air campaigns against a wide variety of enemy capabilities in a wide variety of air operations. As the reader will see, the classic principles of war also apply to air combat. One of the author's important contributions is to demonstrate that perception to those whose grave responsibility one day may be to plan and carry through a victorious air campaign.

Airpower Advantage Diane Therese Putney 2004 American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the context of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf,

General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success—a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future. C. R. Andereg Director of Air Force History

John Warden and the Renaissance of

American Air Power John Andreas Olsen 2011
Dr. John Andreas Olsen has written an insightful, compelling biography of retired U.S. Air Force colonel John A. Warden III, the brilliant but controversial air warfare theorist and architect of Operation Desert Storm's air campaign. Warden's radical ideas about air power's purposes and applications, promulgated at the expense of his own career, sparked the ongoing revolution in military affairs. Legendary in defense circles, Warden is also the author of *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* (republished by Brassey's, Inc. in 1989). Presenting both the positives and negatives of Warden's personality and impact in this objective portrait, Olsen offers a trenchant analysis of his revolutionary ideas and great accomplishments.

The Air Campaign III Warden John A. 1998 "The Air Force staff quickly came up with an air campaign, the brainchild of Colonel John Warden, a brilliant, brash fighter pilot and a leading Air Force intellectual on the use of airpower...

Warden's original plan would undergo numerous modifications...but his original concept remained the heart of the Desert Storm air war." Colin Powell Colin Powell, *My American Journey* Since its original publication *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat* has been translated into more than a half dozen languages and is in use at military colleges throughout the world. This book would later serve as the basis for the planning of much of the Gulf War air campaign. Generals Schwarzkopf and Powell credited Col. Warden with creating the air campaign that defeated Iraq in the Gulf War. This new edition includes a new epilogue where Col. Warden has refined and

extended many of the ideas presented in the original book. The most significant of these refinements is the development of the theory of the enemy as a system—which flows from the center of gravity concepts developed in the first edition.

The American Experience in Vietnam Grace Sevy 1991-07-01 Essays discuss America's strategy during the Vietnam War, what it was like to fight there, the role of the press, the antiwar movement, and American guilt over the war
Every Man A Tiger (Revised) Tom Clancy 2008-01-02 General Chuck Horner commanded the U.S. and allied air assets—the forces of a dozen nations—during Desert Shield and Desert Storm, and was responsible for the design and execution of one of the most devastating air campaigns in history. Never before has the Gulf air war planning, a process filled with controversy and stormy personalities, been revealed in such rich, provocative detail. And in this revised edition, General Horner looks at the current Gulf conflict—and comments on the use of air power in Iraq today.

Scratch One Flattop Robert C. Stern 2019-05-14 A study of the historic World War II naval battle, the first involving aircraft carriers and first in which neither warship was in sight of the other. By the beginning of May 1942, five months after the Pearl Harbor attack, the US Navy was ready to challenge the Japanese moves in the South Pacific. When the Japanese sent troops to New Guinea and the Solomon Islands, the Americans sent the carriers Lexington and Yorktown to counter the move, setting the stage for the Battle of the Coral Sea . . . In this book, historian Robert C. Stern analyzes the Battle of the Coral Sea, the first major fleet engagement where the warships were never in sight of each other. Unlike the Battle of Midway, the Battle of the Coral Sea has received remarkably little study. Stern covers not only the action of the ships and their air groups but also describes the impact of this pivotal engagement. His analysis looks at the short-term impact as well as the long-term implications, including the installation of inert gas fuel-system purging on all American aircraft carriers and the push to integrate sensor systems with fighter direction to

better protect against enemy aircraft. The essential text on the first carrier air campaign, *Scratch One Flattop* is a landmark study on an overlooked battle in the first months of the United States' engagement in World War II. "His research into sources on both sides is exhaustive and he has used Japanese translators where necessary and appropriate to best illuminate materials. His effort has taken years of meticulous scholarship and it shows. . . . Highly recommended." —Lisle A. Rose, *The Northern Mariner / Le marin du nord*

The USAF in the Persian Gulf War Department of Defense 2017-05-18 American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the context of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future. Chapter 1 - OPLAN 1002-90 * Chapter 2 - Instant Thunder * Chapter 3 - Desert Storm Phase I * Chapter 4 - Desert Shield Planning * Chapter 5 - JFACC and Instant Thunder * Chapter 6 - Special Planning Group * Chapter 7 - Phase I Triumphant * Chapter

8 - Phases II, III, and IV * Chapter 9 - Problems and Solutions Planning air campaigns is crucially important to airmen, notably to those planning the 1991 Desert Storm campaign. Their air plan emerged, expanded, and evolved as individuals from Florida and South Carolina military bases, from Saudi Arabia, the Pentagon, and the White House all contributed to the process. That the officers responsible for crafting the Gulf War air plan found the ordeal to be arduous, complicated, and contentious is undeniable, but we have now a documented, close look at the collaborative, intellectual effort that went into producing their war plan. Although planning is seemingly less exciting than combat, the Desert Storm undertaking included strong-willed officers, bold thinking, and the clash and melding of ideas. Planners knew that if their ideas were not sound and shrewd, they doomed the pilots and the war's outcome. Many key participants generously shared their experiences, and their vivid words enliven this account. When Iraq invaded Kuwait in August 1990, the unified combatant command responsible for Southwest Asia, the U.S. Central Command, had no offensive plan ready to execute in response to Iraqi aggression. The U.S. Central Command Commander, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, USA, directed and participated in the offensive planning process that lasted throughout Desert Shield and continued even as the air war commenced on January 17, 1991. He described the enterprise: "It is a tortuous process coming up with the decisions that involve the lives of hundreds of thousands of people. It's not simple. . . . You agonize over your decisions. You agonize over your plan." Because the Central Command commander would execute air operations in all phases of his offensive plan, the air campaign was the dominant feature in the Gulf War of 1991. As early as August 25, 1990, the basic framework of the war plan had emerged, with Phase I, Strategic Air Campaign; Phase II, Air Supremacy in Kuwait; Phase III, Attrition of Ground Combat Power (later, Preparation of the Battlefield); and Phase IV, Ground Attack. *Decisive Force* Richard G. Davis 1996-01-01 Examines the U.S. Air Force strategic bombing campaign of Iraq & Iraqi armed forces occupying

Kuwait from January 17th through February 28th, 1991 . Describes the aircraft & weapons, changes in technology & the reexamination & reapplication of traditional strategic bombing theory by USAF planning officers. Provides a chronological review of the campaign with an analysis of the results. Photos, maps, graphs & tables. Includes suggested readings.

Evolution of the Air Campaign Planning Process and the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS) Daniel Gonzales 1996 This report summarizes an examination of the air campaign planning process, including observation of how the process was conducted in recent exercises and a review of how the process was performed during the Gulf War. A number of suggested changes to the process are recommended that, in conjunction with changes to the Contingency Theater Automated Planning System (CTAPS), could improve the process significantly and reduce the time needed for production of the Air Tasking Order from 48 to 24 hours. CTAPS capabilities were examined as a part of this study. The CTAPS 5.0x and planned 6.0 architectures were reviewed and suggestions presented that could enhance the operational capabilities of the system. This report should be of interest to project managers and monitors of CTAPS and related programs, to those interested in the air campaign planning process, and to those responsible for developing Department of Defense or Air Force information system architectures.

The Air Campaign David R. Mets 1998 Much has been made about the planning for and execution of the aerial dimension of the 1991 Gulf War against Iraq. A major debate both within and outside of the US Air Force has been associated with the influence of Col John Warden. He was then a member of the Air Staff in the Pentagon and theoretically without an assigned function in theater-level campaign planning. Arguments that the Gulf War was a manifestation of a revolution in military affairs (RMA) with profound implications have greatly but unnecessarily complicated the debate. Equally important is the argument that antedated the Gulf War to the effect that such conflicts between states using conventional weapons and methods are a passing

phenomenon. The Gulf War might have been the last of its breed.

Joint Targeting Planning Training Guide

James F. Love 1998 "This guide resulted from an effort to develop a new approach to assessment and diagnostic training feedback in joint training. The guide resulted from a front-end analysis of joint targeting for an air campaign planning simulation. The analysis generated detailed training objectives, measurement instruments, and self-assessment procedures for each objective. For each phase of the joint targeting cycle, inputs, behavioral processes, and products were specified and incorporated in measurement tools. The measures were developmentally applied during Blue Flag 97-1. Blue Flag is a recurring cycle of air campaign planning exercises, managed by a numbered air force. Lessons learned from the application were combined with comments for Blue Flag participants to produce this joint training guide in its current form."--DTIC.

The Air War, 1939-1945 Richard J. Overy 2020-11-24 The Air War, 1939-1945 was first written in the late 1970s when there was very little academic interest in the history of air power. What there was focused largely on combat. The book was intended to provide a global history of the air war by looking at combat, but also the broader context of technology, production, intelligence and leadership. The book sought to address the question of why the Allies in the end won decisively the war in the air, and concluded that Axis air forces were too tied to a narrow conception of air power attached to surface forces, rather than air power exercised in a broader framework of air defense, logistics, strategic bombing and technological development. The book has been assigned reading in military and air force academies for the past forty years. "The Air War, 1939-1945... immediately and permanently altered the way that historians have examined the nature of aerial warfare during World War II. Overy's ingenious examination of the global nature of planning, building, deploying, and utilizing air forces remains the finest overall study of the topic more than a quarter-century after its first publication... conclusions drawn in this work... are even today an integral part of U.S.

Air Force doctrine.” — Dik A. Daso, US Air Force Chief of Staff’s Reading List “This is an outstanding book on a subject in which past controversy has often generated more heat than light... The strength of the book is... Overy’s masterly discussion of the economic problems of sustaining air forces in war and of hitting the right balance between quantity production of current models and diversion of resources to research and technical innovation... Truly this is a book that deserves attention from all those who wish to study, and learn from, the history of warfare.” — G. C. Peden, Naval War College Review “[T]ightly written... The Air War, 1939-1945 is essential reading for all military historians.” — James J. Hudson, Military Affairs “[O]ne of the best books on aviation in World War II.” — Kenneth P. Werrell, Air Power History “An important and successful book.” — The Economist “Highly effective. The result, as so often with sound scholarship, is the ruthless dispelling of myths.” — A. J. P. Taylor, author of The Origins of the Second World War “The Air War is... an excellent and stimulating book which both needs and deserves slow and careful reading. It is an ambitious book, too, and Dr. Overy should be congratulated for breaking down national histories in writing his history of air power during the Second World War.” — Malcolm Smith, The International History Review “[A] recognized classic.” — Richard B. Frank, The Journal of American History “Originally published in 1980 and still the best one-volume aerial history of World War II, Richard Overy’s classic work remains profound and highly original... [it] deepens our understanding not only of World War II but of military history in general.” — The SHAFR Guide Online “[A]n outstanding book... The Air War is a serious and profound treatise that analyses those various military and civilian themes which, in combination, determined the nature of the struggle in the air during the Second World War... The Air War is something of a novelty in aeronautical literature. It is to be hoped that it will serve as a model for other books to come in this important field.” — Alfred Gollin, The English Historical Review “Overy provides operational accounts of the air-forces’ role in Europe... and in the Pacific. Then, and most

exceptionally, he deals separately with all facets of the air war: planning, organization, manpower, equipment, and doctrine... honest... broadly informed, and... well-stocked with useful data.” — Kirkus “R. J. Overy examines the whole war period from the point of view of each of the warring powers and gives us not only a study of military campaigns but also a highly successful examination of aerial doctrine, economic and scientific mobilization, and the political, diplomatic, and military aspects of the management of hostilities. This fine study analyzes the achievements and the failures of the aerial component of the war... This good analysis of many studies done on this subject... makes possible a new, balanced synthesis from an objective point of view.” — Sam H. Frank, The American Historical Review

Air Campaign Gordon Press Publishers 1998-03
[The Ia Drang Campaign 1965: A Successful Operational Campaign Or Mere Tactical Failure?](#)
Lt.-Col. Peter J. Schifferle 2015-11-06 This monograph analyzes the effectiveness of operational campaign design during the initial US ground combat in the Vietnam War. The focus is on the linkage of national strategic ends with military means and ways from the Spring of 1965 through the results of the Ia Drang battles of November 1965. The monograph identifies lessons from this period that are applicable to current US Joint and Army doctrine as well as lessons for planners and executors of US military action under the American system of civilian control of the military. First, the monograph evaluates current US doctrine for campaigns and identifies the concept of linkage of national strategic ends with military ways and means as critical to successful campaign design. Then the monograph assesses US military doctrine in 1965, identifying the weakness of unconventional warfare capabilities. A detailed discussion of the concept of both limited war and gradualism as national strategies, includes the limits on military action imposed by these strategies. Section III identifies specific military objectives identified by the National Command Authority, including preventing the war in Vietnam from escalating to a general war. The primacy of President Johnson’s

domestic concerns is also identified. The monograph then assesses the effectiveness of US military campaign planning and execution in 1965. The conclusion is that the operational ways and means used by General Westmoreland in the conduct of his chosen strategy of attrition were not linked in any way with the national strategic aim of limited warfare. The monograph also identifies a failure in supervision by civilian leaders, and the Joint Chiefs of Staff, of the military planning and conduct of the air and ground campaign in South Vietnam. Too little supervision was the cause of failure, not over supervision by the civilian and military leadership.

The Air Campaign John A. Warden, III 1994-05-01

One of the first analyses of the pure art of planning the aerial dimensions of war. Explores the complicated connection between air superiority and victory in war. Focuses on the use of air forces at the operational level in a theater of war. Presents fascinating historical examples, stressing that the mastery of operational-level strategy can be the key to winning future wars. 20 photos. Bibliography.

Military Review 1984

Air Force Combat Units of World War II

Operation Desert Storm Kwai-Cheung Chan 1997-06 This is the unclassified version of a classified report; 85% of the original classified material is presented in this report. Addresses: the use and performance of aircraft, munitions, and missiles employed during the air campaign; the validity of DoD and manufacturer claims about weapon systems' performance, particularly those systems utilizing advanced technology; the relationship between cost and performance of weapon systems; and the extent that air campaign objectives were met. Discusses: LGB accuracy, F-117 and TLAM effectiveness, IADS capabilities, target sensor technologies, combat support platforms, and more.

Gulf War Air Power Survey Thomas A. Keaney 1993

NATO's Air War for Kosovo Benjamin S. Lambeth 2001-11-16 This book offers a thorough appraisal of Operation Allied Force, NATO's 78-day air war to compel the president of Yugoslavia, Slobodan Milosevic, to end his campaign of ethnic cleansing

in Kosovo. The author sheds light both on the operation's strengths and on its most salient weaknesses. He outlines the key highlights of the air war and examines the various factors that interacted to induce Milosevic to capitulate when he did. He then explores air power's most critical accomplishments in Operation Allied Force as well as the problems that hindered the operation both in its planning and in its execution. Finally, he assesses Operation Allied Force from a political and strategic perspective, calling attention to those issues that are likely to have the greatest bearing on future military policymaking. The book concludes that the air war, although by no means the only factor responsible for the allies' victory, certainly set the stage for Milosevic's surrender by making it clear that he had little to gain by holding out. It concludes that in the end, Operation Allied Force's most noteworthy distinction may lie in the fact that the allies prevailed despite the myriad impediments they faced.

Air Campaigns: Fact Or Fantasy? Major Mark H. Skattum 2014-08-15 This monograph addresses the concept of air operations and their relationship to campaigns. It determines whether air actions should be considered as operations or campaigns. The monograph first addresses the definitions of the terms "campaign" and "operation," and then establishes the criteria by which to judge three historical examples of the use of air power. These examples are the Battle of Britain, the Korean War air interdiction battle, and the Israeli pre-emptive strike against the Egyptian Air Force during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The monograph concludes that air operations should not be considered as campaigns. Air operations are part of the overall campaign and support campaign objectives rather than accomplishing strategic goals. The implications of this analysis are that air superiority should be the primary air operation; offensive air and ground operations must be synchronized for success; and the terms and concepts applied to ground operations can be applied to air operations. By understanding the correct relationship between air operations and campaigns, air planners can help Army planners prepare for success on the joint battlefield.

Airpower Advantage Diane T. Putney 2015-02-02 American air power is a dominant force in today's world. Its ascendancy, evolving in the half century since the end of World War II, became evident during the first Gulf War. Although a great deal has been written about military operations in Desert Shield and Desert Storm, this deeply researched volume by Dr. Diane Putney probes the little-known story of how the Gulf War air campaign plan came to fruition. Based on archival documentation and interviews with USAF planners, this work takes the reader into the planning cells where the difficult work of building an air campaign plan was accomplished on an around-the-clock basis. The tension among air planners is palpable as Dr. Putney traces the incremental progress and friction along the way. The author places the complexities of the planning process within the context of coalition objectives. All the major players are here: President George H. W. Bush, General H. Norman Schwarzkopf, General Colin Powell, General Chuck Horner, and Secretary of Defense Richard Cheney. The air planning process generated much debate and friction, but resulted in great success - a 43-day conflict with minimum casualties. Dr. Putney's rendering of this behind-the-scenes evolution of the planning process, in its complexity and even suspense, provides a fascinating window into how wars are planned and fought today and what might be the implications for the future.

Heart of the Storm Richard T. Reynolds,, Richard T Reynolds , USAF 2005-07-01 Airmen all over the world felt relief and exhilaration as the war in the Gulf reached its dramatic conclusion on 28 February 1991. Many nonairmen, of course, experienced those emotions as well-but for a variety of different reasons. Airmen, long uneasy about the lingering inconclusiveness of past applications of their form of military power, now had what they believed to be an example of air power decisiveness so indisputably successful as to close the case forever. Within the United States Air Force, among those who thought about the uses of air power, there were two basic groups of airmen. The first-smaller and less influential-held to the views of early air pioneers in their belief that air power was best applied in a

comprehensive, unitary way to achieve strategic results. The second-much more dominant-had come to think of air power in its tactical applications as a supportive element of a larger surface (land or maritime) campaign. Thinking in terms of strategic air campaigns, members of the first group found their inclinations reinforced by Col John Warden's book, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*, published in 1988. Over the years, the second group increasingly concentrated on refining specific mission capabilities (close air support, interdiction, air refueling, etc.) that could be offered to a joint force commander for his allocation decisions. Members of this group rarely thought in terms of comprehensive air campaigns to achieve strategic objectives and indeed generally equated the term strategic to Strategic Air Command's long-range bomber force in delivery of nuclear weapons. Both groups found agreement in their love of the airplane and their search for acceptance as equal partners with their older sister services. In that regard, airmen everywhere stepped forward in late February to receive the congratulations they felt were so richly deserved. Put aside, for the moment at least, was the fact that a hot and often bitter debate had taken place within the Air Force on the eve of Operation Desert Storm over the very issue of the strategic air campaign and the question of whether air power would be used in that form. Here was a story to be told, a piece of history to be recorded. Just how that story would be told was, to my mind, by no means clear. In the end, of course, the Gulf War did in fact include a strategic air campaign, and the very least that one could say about it was that by so thoroughly destroying the Iraqis' capability to conduct warfare, it permitted a relatively blood-less war-concluding ground operation by coalition army forces. The most that one could say about the air campaign was that it-in and of itself-won the war. At Air University (AU), where I was serving at the time as commander, direct involvement in Desert Shield/Storm was about as limited as in any part of the Air Force. We had done some early macroanalyses of air campaign options in the Air Force Wargaming Center; we had excused some students from their studies at Air Command and

Staff College to act as observers in various headquarters involved in the war; and-like all commands-we had sent support personnel to augment CENTAF forces in the desert. Otherwise, we were as detached as it was possible to be-that is to say, vitally interested but wholly without responsibility. Our responsibility would begin when the guns fell silent. Within that overall context and in the heady moment of selfcongratulation by airmen, two thoughts occurred to me: (1) the story of the Air Force's development of an air campaign would rapidly become hazy as human memories began to fail-either willfully or through natural erosion-and (2) air power's effect on the outcome of the war would become increasingly controversial as non-Air Force institutions realized that their own resources would likely diminish if airmen's conclusions were accepted.

*Air Campaign 2020**

Selling Schweinfurt Brian D. Vlaun 2020-10-15 A common theme of airpower histories is that the Combined Bomber Offensive was the proving ground for a post-war independent air force. Whether or not the United States Army Air Forces (USAAF) could perform to the hype of its interwar doctrine, Allied commanders based their rival approaches to victory in Europe on their differing views of independent airpower. However, there is an essential, yet overlooked facet to this story: commanders' convictions alone could not hold sway within the War Department, much less at the politically and bureaucratically charged meetings of the Combined Chiefs of Staff. The air commanders pressed their staffs for decision-quality assessments and photographic evidence to sell their arguments and project their progress. They needed informed targeting plans and objective post-raid reports as well as an air-intelligence enterprise to mature all-too-quickly out of interwar neglect. What they received—and Brian Vlaun explains—was a collision of organizational interests and leadership personalities that shaped Ira Eaker's command of the Eighth Air Force in 1943, the tumultuous air campaign over Germany, and the path of the post-war U.S. Air Force. As a result of the author's research through thousands of declassified files,

Selling Schweinfurt examines the relationships between air-intelligence organizations and key decision-makers. His analysis spans from pre-war planning and doctrine development, through the Eighth Air Force's independent air campaign, and culminates with the formation of the United States Strategic Air Forces and its 1944 pre-invasion preparations. This book concludes that military organizations, if left unchecked, may adopt symbols and exaggerate claims to justify their own preferences and market their ideas in ways that mask their optimistic assumptions. In the case of the air campaign against Germany, both the four-engine bomber and specialized targets—like Schweinfurt's ball bearings—served as symbols and powerful marketing tools for the AAF and air intelligence, respectively.

On Target: Organizing and Executing the Strategic Air Campaign Against Iraq Richard Harding Davis 2012-05-26 The war in the Persian Gulf in 1991 capped an era of USAF modernization and enhanced readiness begun in the late 1970s and that continued through the 1980s. The long lead-time weapons acquisition and training programs, begun a decade or more earlier, came to fruition against a far different opponent and in an unforeseen locale than that envisioned by their creators. The force designed to counter the superpower foe of the Cold War, the USSR, never fought a direct battle against that enemy during the existence of the Soviet Union. Instead, the USAF fought the first war of the so-called New World Order, a war that had as much in common with the colonial wars of the late nineteenth century as it had with the high-technology wars of the late twentieth century. The USAF shouldered the bulk of the fighting for the first thirty-nine of the conflict's forty-two days. This volume covers the air offensive against strategic military and economic targets within the pre-August 1990 borders of Iraq. The offensive air plan once again displayed the ability of the U.S. military to turn the necessity of improvisation into a virtue when, in mid-August 1990, an element of the Air Staff in the Pentagon wrote the basis of the offensive plan in ten days. The plan was founded upon the precepts of Col. John A. Warden III's air power theories-centers of gravity, shock

effect, and the importance of leadership-related targets. Once the outline plan reached the arena of operations, the U.S. Central Air Forces (CENTAF), under the able leadership of Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, adopted the targeting philosophy of the plan and, after many modifications owing to new targets and an increased force structure, employed it with devastating effect. The author describes not only the outstanding performance of USAF men and machines but also the difficulties and complexities of coordinating the many elements of air and staff operations. Among these were the complex coordination of the fighters with their tankers, the speedy transmission of data from the allseeing eyes of AWACS and JSTARS aircraft, the multiple bomb runs over chemical and biological warfare bunkers, and the shortcomings of certain types of intelligence. All these factors impacted on mission effectiveness. The author also diagrams how outside influences-political pressure from neutrals, such as the Israelis, and from public news media-can affect the direction of the bombing effort. Although this account of the air campaign in the Persian Gulf concentrates on the operational history of a six-week war, it also places that war into its larger political and military context, especially in its tale of the interplay between the U.S. military and civilian leadership. It illustrates, with reference to actual missions, the operational advantages of stealth fighter bombers as well as their vulnerabilities. Davis presents the reader with a detailed account of one of the USAF's most important air operations in the last half of the twentieth century. In the decade after the conclusion of the Gulf War, the pattern of strategic air operations against Iraq became the template for USAF operations over Bosnia and during the air war over Serbia and, most recently, in Afghanistan as well. In planning for air operations in the Balkans, USAF officers were strongly influenced by John A. Warden's methodology and ideology with its emphasis on centers of gravity and strikes on leadership targets. Stealth air combat operations, inaugurated en masse in the Gulf War, became even more prevalent with the introduction of the

B-2 bomber. Likewise, the use of precision weapons grew. The aversion of western democracies to both military and civilian casualties and their effect on targeting, tactics, and strategy first encountered over Iraq became more pronounced in subsequent conflicts-as did the continuing challenge in matching accurate intelligence to precision weapons.

The Air Campaign Sanu Kainikara 2008 "The Royal Australian Air Force, by choice, uses the term air campaign to describe the contribution its air power makes in joint, coalition and multi-agency campaigns in support of national security objectives."--Provided by publisher.

Selling Schweinfurt Brain Vlaun 2020 "As a result of the author's research through thousands of declassified files, Selling Schweinfurt examines the relationships between air-intelligence organizations and key decision-makers. His analysis spans from pre-war planning and doctrine development, through the Eighth Air Force's independent air campaign, and culminates with the formation of the United States Strategic Air Forces and its 1944 pre-invasion preparations."--Fifteenth Air Force against the Axis Kevin A. Mahoney 2013-04-25 In Fifteenth Air Force against the Axis: Combat Missions over Europe during World War II, historian Kevin A. Mahoney provides a detailed combat history of the crucial role played by this air force from November 1943 through May 1945. Presented by month in chronological order, Mahoney describes all the major bombing and fighter missions carried out by this air force within a strategic context. Each chapter includes an introduction describing developments in the evolution of the strategic air campaign against the Germans, highlights the purpose and importance of the month's operations, and reviews the Luftwaffe's resistance and changes in tactics and important developments in the Fifteenth Air Force's organization. Each monthly narrative further explores most missions, detailing the number of aircraft lost during these missions. Losses are based on an exhaustively researched database compiled by Mahoney that contains details of almost 3,000 aircraft. Target damage is mentioned, while enemy opposition is also

described for each mission. Appendices include four short essays on bombing operations (planning and flying of missions, tactics and techniques, bomb types, and bombing accuracy), tactics employed by fighter escort in aerial combat and strafing, combat crews and their aircraft (including a comparison of American fighters and bombers, the training of the crews, and their combat tours), and the Fifteenth Air Force command structure (including the use of intelligence, photo and weather reconnaissance, and the considerable effect of weather on Fifteenth Air Force operations). This work of military history is ideal for students and scholars of the air war in Europe.

Creech Blue James C. Slife 2004 Colonel Slife chronicles the influence of the late Gen Wilbur L. "Bill" Creech⁷a leader, visionary, warrior, and mentor⁷in the areas of equipment and tactics, training, organization, and leader development. His study serves both to explain the context of a turbulent time in our Air Force's history and to reveal where tomorrow's airmen may find answers to some of the difficult challenges facing them today. Colonel Slife, who addresses such controversial topics as the development of the Army's AirLand Battle doctrine and what it meant to airmen, is among the first to describe what historians will surely see in years to come as the revolutionary developments of the late 1970s/early 1980s and General Creech's central role. Creech Blue enlightens the Air Force on its strongly held convictions during that period and challenges the idea that by 1990, when Iraq invaded Kuwait, the Air Force had forgotten how to wage a "strategic" air campaign and was dangerously close to plunging into a costly and lengthy war of attrition had it not been for the vision of a small cadre of thinkers on the Air Staff. In exploring the doctrine and language of the decade leading up to Operation Desert Storm, Colonel Slife reveals that the Air Force was not as shortsighted as many people have argued.

The Command of the Air Giulio Douhet 2009-08-26 The Italian General Giulio Douhet reigns as one of the twentieth century's foremost strategic air power theorists. As such scholars as Raymond Flugel have pointed out, Douhet's

theories were crucial at a pivotal pre-World War II Army Air Force institution, the Air Corps Tactical School.

Managing Command and Control in the Persian Gulf War Thomas C. Hone 1996-09-24 During Desert Shield, the Air Force built a very complicated organizational architecture to control large numbers of air sorties. During the air campaign itself, officers at each level of the Central Command Air Forces believed they were managing the chaos of war. Yet, when the activities of the many significant participants are pieced together, it appears that neither the planners nor Lt. Gen. Charles A. Horner, the Joint Force Air Component Commander, knew the details of what was happening in the air campaign or how well the campaign was going. There was little appreciation of the implications of complex organizational architectures for military command and control. Against a smarter and more aggressive foe, the system may well have failed.

Storm Over Iraq Richard Hallion 2015-05-26 An incisive account of the Persian Gulf War, Storm Over Iraq shows how the success of Operation Desert Storm was the product of two decades of profound changes in the American approach to defense, military doctrine, and combat operations. The first detailed analysis of why the Gulf War could be fought the way it was, the book examines the planning and preparation for war. Richard P. Hallion argues that the ascendancy of precision air power in warfare—which fulfilled the promise that air power had held for more than seventy-five years—reflects the revolutionary adaptation of a war strategy that targets things rather than people, allowing one to control an opposing nation without destroying it.

Heart of the Storm, The Genesis of the Air Campaign Against Iraq 1995 Airmen all over the world felt relief and exhilaration as the Gulf War reached its conclusion on 28 February 1991. Many nonairmen experienced those emotions as well—but for a variety of different reasons. Airmen, long uneasy about the lingering inconclusiveness of past applications of their form of military power, now had what they believed to be an indisputably decisive example of air power victory. Within the United States Air Force, among those who thought

about the uses of air power, there were two basic groups of airmen. The smaller and less influential group held to the view that air power was best applied in a comprehensive, unitary way to achieve strategic results. The second, more dominant group had come to think of air power in its tactical applications as a supportive element of a larger surface (land or maritime) campaign. Thinking in terms of strategic air campaigns, members of the first group found their inclinations reinforced by Col John Warden's book, *The Air Campaign: Planning for Combat*, published in 1988. Over the years, the second group increasingly concentrated on refining specific mission capabilities, that could be offered to a joint force commander for his allocation decisions. Members of this group rarely thought in terms of comprehensive air campaigns to achieve strategic objectives. In the end, the Gulf War did include a Strategic Air Campaign. It is the purpose of this report to record the history of that air campaign as quickly and honestly as possible.

Command and control for joint air operations.

The Unseen War Benjamin S Lambeth 2013-10-15 America's second war against Iraq differed notably from its first. Operation Desert Storm was a limited effort by coalition forces to drive out those Iraqi troops who had seized Kuwait six months before. In contrast, the major combat phase of Operation Iraqi Freedom in 2003 was a more ambitious undertaking aimed at decisively ending Saddam Hussein's rule. After several days of intense air strikes against fixed enemy targets, allied air operations began concentrating on Iraqi ground troops. The intended effect was to destroy Iraqi resistance and allow coalition land forces to maneuver without pausing in response to enemy actions. Iraqi tank concentrations were struck with consistently lethal effect, paving the way for an allied entrance into Baghdad that was largely unopposed. Hussein's regime finally collapsed on April 9. Viewed in hindsight, it was the combination of allied air power as an indispensable enabler and the unexpected rapidity of the allied ground advance that allowed coalition forces to overrun Baghdad before Iraq could mount a coherent defense. In achieving this unprecedented level of performance, allied air

power was indispensable in setting the conditions for the campaign's end. Freedom from attack and freedom to attack prevailed for allied ground forces. The intended effect of allied air operations was to facilitate the quickest capture of Baghdad without the occurrence of any major head-to-head battles on the ground. This impressive short-term achievement, however, was soon overshadowed by the ensuing insurgency that continued for four years thereafter in Iraq. The mounting costs of that turmoil tended, for a time, to render the campaign's initial successes all but forgotten. Only more recently did the war begin showing signs of reaching an agreeable end when the coalition's commander put into effect a new counterinsurgency strategy in 2007 aimed at providing genuine security for Iraqi citizens. The toppling of Hussein's regime ended the iron rule of an odious dictator who had brutalized his people for more than 30 years. Yet the inadequate resourcing with which that goal was pursued showed that any effective plan for a regime takedown must include due hedging against the campaign's likely aftermath in addition to simply seeing to the needs of major combat. That said, despite the failure of the campaign's planners to underwrite the first need adequately, those who conducted the three-week offensive in pursuit of regime change performed all but flawlessly, thanks in considerable part to the mostly unobserved but crucial enabling contributions of allied air power.

Toward Combined Arms Warfare J. M. House 1985 **Six-Day War 1967** Shlomo Aloni 2019-06-18 The story of how the Israeli Force achieved one of the most audacious and important air power victories in history, wiping out enemy air forces more than twice its own size in a single morning. This new illustrated study examines the planning, execution and aftermath of Operation Focus showing how it not only effectively won the Six Day War for Israel, but also impacted military thinking--in the Middle East and all over the globe--so profoundly that military leaders' perceptions of air superiority were practically transformed in its wake, signalling a turning point in the Cold War. The Israeli Air Force's Operation Focus was not only a watershed in the history of the modern Middle

East but was one of the greatest and most effective air superiority campaigns ever waged. On a single morning, almost the entire IAF was committed to a surprise, preemptive airstrike

against the air forces of the encircling Arab states. The attack was extraordinarily successful. Hundreds of Arab aircraft were destroyed, their airfields crippled, and the IAF gained almost complete air supremacy for the rest of the war.